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a case for the uNited states’ oPPositioN of 
iNterNatioNal aNd domestic coal suBsidies
by Josh Fieldstone*
Since the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change1 came into effect in 1994, international financial institutions have provided more than $37 bil-
lion in direct financial support for at least 88 new and expanded 
coal plants.2 Although the United States has stated that it wants 
to deter international financial institutions from subsidizing 
coal,3 it supports its vast domestic coal subsidies.4 So long as 
these subsidies remain, the United States should refrain from 
opposing international coal subsidies in order to maintain its 
credibility.5 The United States faces the following dilemma: 
it could either actively oppose domestic and international coal 
subsidies even though the subsidies are in its short-term energy 
interest, or it could continue supporting coal subsidies despite 
coal’s long-term damaging effect on the environment and human 
health. The United States should prioritize public health and 
environmental interests and oppose all coal subsidies domesti-
cally and internationally. Specifically, it should begin by with-
drawing tax credits for domestic coal production and pressure 
the World Bank to stop funding coal projects internationally. 
International financial institutions have continued to finance 
coal projects despite the emergence of climate change as a major 
international issue.6 Meanwhile, the United States refrained 
from applying political pressure to curb such financing. In 2010, 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“IBRD”), one of five institutions that compose the World Bank 
Group, funded a record high $4.4 billion for coal projects7 in 
the face of both substantial protests8 and a recommendation by 
the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review to refrain from 
financing coal.9 The United States Executive Director abstained 
from voting on—and using its substantial political clout10 to 
oppose—the largest of the projects,11 a $3 billion loan to a South 
African coal-fired power plant.12 However, if the United States 
takes a more active stance against coal projects, it could send 
a stronger message of opposition to international institutions 
that fund coal, in which the United States is involved, including 
the Inter-American Development Bank13 and the African Devel-
opment Bank.14
The United States has not only refrained from opposing 
international financial institutions’ funding of coal, it has also 
continued subsidizing coal domestically. A great percentage of 
these domestic subsidies come from the Internal Revenue Code 
Section 45k15 credit for production of nonconventional fuels.16 
This tax credit amounted to a $14 billion subsidy between 2002 
and 2008, which has primarily benefited coal producers.17 In 
addition to tax credits, the United States’ subsidies for coal 
include low-interest loans18 and loan guarantees.19
The United States has a strong incentive to promote coal 
subsidies because it has substantial short-term interest in 
maintaining—and even expanding—its present coal use to 
reduce energy costs and unemployment.20 The United States 
has more coal reserves than anywhere else in the world and is 
the second largest producer after China.21 In 2009, coal mines 
alone employed 90,000 people in the United States.22 Coal can 
generate usable energy at a cost between $1 and $2 per Million 
Metric British Thermal Units (“MMBtu”) compared to $6 to $12 
per MMBtu for oil and natural gas, providing an inexpensive and 
relatively stable energy source.23 Additionally fifty percent of 
electricity generation in the United States is dependant on coal, 
illustrating both the United States’ interest in coal use and the 
importance of its domestic coal policy.24
Even though the United States’ short term interests favor 
coal subsidies, its long term interest are against them. Some 
of the downsides of coal use are immediately tangible such 
as harm to the environment25 and health hazards to those 
working at coal facilities.26 Still, perhaps the most pressing 
concern is its effect on climate change.27 A recent study of 
Harvard’s Center for Health and the Global Environment found 
that the total external cost—the negative effect of an economic 
activity on a third party—of United States’ coal-use28 could 
amount to $523 billion annually.29 The National Resource 
Council found the external costs to be $120 billion even without 
generally taking coal’s effect on climate change into account.30
In light of these long-term realities, the United Sates 
should oppose coal subsidies domestically by terminating the 
tax credit for production of nonconventional fuels and inter-
nationally by pressuring the IBRD to refrain from giving any 
further loans to coal projects. By subsidizing coal now and 
leaving the greater cost of externalities for the future, the United 
States is supporting an economically and socially irresponsible 
position. Ending the existing tax credit and pressuring the IBRD 
would help mitigate coal’s effect on climate change, catapult the 
United States as a credible leader on the climate change debate, 
and protect the United States from the predicted economic losses 
that far outweigh its current problems. 
*Josh Fieldstone is a J.D. candidate, May 2013, at American University Wash-
ington College of Law.
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